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SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS: ARE THEY
ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?
Lisa S. Chen*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anne Magro and Heather Finstuen have lived happily
together for over twelve years and are the proud parents of
two six-year-old twin girls.1 They bring snacks to soccer
games, cheer on their daughters at T-ball games, and carpool
with other parents to gymnastics practice.2 Aside from living
in an openly lesbian relationship while raising their daugh-
ters, the Magro-Finstuen household is typical of most families
in the United States. However, the security of knowing that
both women have legal status as parents is threatened by a
new Oklahoma statute that refuses to recognize adoptions is-
sued by other states to same-sex couples.4
In the past decade, the number of families with same-sex
parents in the United States has increased dramatically.-
Many state courts and legislatures have responded by creat-
ing second-parent adoptions, which allow the non-biological
parent in such relationships to adopt the child without sever-
* Lead Symposium Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; M.A., Sociology, B.A., Psychology, B.S.,
Biological Sciences, Stanford University.
1. Second Amended Complaint at 13, Finstuen v. Edmondson (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 4, 2005) (No. CIV-04-1152C).
2. See T. Shawn Taylor, Ties that Unwind; Legal Cases and Some State
Laws Threaten to Undo Lesbian Couples' Adoptions, Parental Arrangements,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 2004, at 1.
3. See id.
4. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (West Supp. 2004). The statute
states "[t]his state, or any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not rec-
ognize an edoption by more than one individual of the same sex from any other
state or foreign jurisdiction." Id.
5. See Taylor, supra note 2. According to 2000 U.S. Census data, 34% of all
lesbian couples and 22% of all gay male couples are raising children under the
age of 18. This is an increase from 1990, when only 19.5% of all lesbian couples
and 5% of male couples were raising children under 18. See id.
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ing the biological parent's rights.6  In the Magro-Finstuen
household, Anne conceived the twins through artificial in-
semination7 and Heather obtained a valid second-parent
adoption after the twins were born.' The new Oklahoma
statute threatens to nullify Heather's valid adoption issued
by the State of New Jersey.
The State of Michigan has followed Oklahoma's lead.
Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox announced in Septem-
ber 2004 that "gay adoption is against state law and that, as
a matter of policy, Michigan will not recognize adoptions per-
formed in other states."9
The Oklahoma statute refusing to recognize same-sex
adoptions raises issues that intersect both constitutional and
family law. Unlike marriages, which are granted by state
legislatures, 10 adoptions are granted by a court of competent
jurisdiction.1' The United States Constitution's Full Faith
and Credit Clause requires state court judgments to be given
the same effect in every other state. 2 Therefore, the Okla-
homa statute may run contrary to the Constitution by refus-
ing to recognize valid adoption decrees issued by other states
to same-sex couples.
To challenge the Oklahoma statute, Magro and Finstuen,
6. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
7. See Taylor, supra note 2.
8. See id. Heather's legal status as a parent enables her to sign permission
slips for school-related events, consent to medical treatment, and include the
twins in her medical benefits package. See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing
Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent Adoption, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 936 (2000). Heather would now also have standing to
ask for visitation or custody of the girls in the event of separation. See id. Fur-
ther, the children now have the right to inherit from Heather and to receive any
life insurance benefits she may carry. See id.
9. Staff Editorial, Gay Adoption Decision Unmerited, MICH. DAILY, Sept.
21, 2004.
10. See generally Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV.
255 (1998) [hereinafter Whitten, Original Understanding] (examining the rele-
vance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its impact on the Federal Defense
of Marriage Act).
11. See Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgment Issues
in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2003) [hereinafter
Whitten, Choice of Law].
12. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution states that "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
[Vol: 46
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS
and several gay families, 13 filed a lawsuit in Oklahoma fed-
eral court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.14 The
parties did not request changes to Oklahoma's adoption laws
or public policies regarding gay rights, but merely asked for
assurances that the state would allow them to retain the legal
protection granted to them by their final adoption orders from
other states.'5
This comment will explore the various constitutional is-
sues surrounding the Oklahoma statute. Part II of this com-
ment will provide background information on adoption law
and on the creation of second-parent adoptions for families
with same-sex parents. 6 Part II will also discuss the history
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its application by
modern courts, especially in relation to valid divorce decrees
issued by other states. 7 Part III will specifically address the
problems posed by the passage of the Oklahoma statute. 8
Using the cases discussed in Part II, Part IV will analyze the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute in light of past
court decisions. 19 Finally, Part V will propose that federal
courts strike down the Oklahoma statute as unconstitutional
because it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution.2"
II. BACKGROUND
A. Adoption Law
1. Introduction to American Adoption Law
Although this comment focuses largely on the implica-
tions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a rudimentary un-
13. See discussion infra Part II.C.
14. Complaint, Finstuen v. Edmondson, 2004 WL 3139176 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 15, 2004) (No. 04-CV1152).
15. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 9 ("If something hap-
pened to Anne, would I (a) be able to make medical or school decisions for the
girls, and (b) could I retain custody of them? If my adoption is not recognized,
then the children could become wards of the state and their custody could be up
for grabs."). See Taylor, supra note 2.
16. See discussion infra Part II.A.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
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derstanding of adoption law is necessary to put the topic in
context. Adoption is traditionally perceived as a positive
occurrence in society.21 It allows children who do not have
parents to find new homes and parents.22 An adoption also
creates a legal bond between the non-biological parent and
the child, replacing the biological parents' previous rights and
responsibilities toward the child.23
Adoption is a statutorily-created right, similar to that of
marriage and divorce.24 Each state legislature has the right
to create its own requirements and policies with regard to
adoption.25 Therefore, there are variations in adoption re-
quirements among the states.26 However, most state adoption
statutes share similar elements, such as the consent of cer-
tain parties, 27 a home study of the prospective adoptive par-
ents,28 and a judicial determination that the adoption is in the
best interests of the child.29
Most adoption laws also contain a "cut-off' provision that
requires either the surrender of the child's legal rights and
21. See generally David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical
History of American Adoption Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 459 (2000). Profes-
sor Papke critically reviews the history of American adoption law, theorizing
that changes in adoption laws were meant to favor the upper and middle
classes. See id.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616 (Deering 2004); see also Schacter, supra
note 8, at 936-37.
24. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 300, 2300 (Deering 2004).
25. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936 n.13.
26. See id. at 936. The choice-of-law to be applied during an adoption pro-
ceeding is usually the law of the forum. LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL III ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 223, at 781 (5th ed. 2001). However, the "inci-
dents" of adoption, such as the parent's right to discipline the child and the
child's inheritance rights, are governed by the law of the state in which the par-
ent and child are living when the issue arises, even though the adoption may
have taken place in another state. See Whitten, Choice of Law, supra note 11,
at 807.
27. In California, consent of the biological parents is required by statute.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604 (Deering 2004). For children over the age of twelve,
their consent to the adoption is also required by California statute. Id. § 8602.
New York requires the consent of the adoptive child if over fourteen years of
age, the consent of the parents or surviving parent, and the consent of either the
mother or the father if the child was born out of wedlock. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
111 (McKinney 2004).
28. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936.
29. See id. at 936; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612(c) (Deering 2004)
(stating that "[i f satisfied that the interest of the child will be promoted by this
adoption, the court may make and enter an order of adoption of the child by the
prospective adoptive parent or parents").
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responsibilities by the birth parent(s), or the court-ordered
termination of such legal rights.3 Once either has occurred,
the adoptive parents may then acquire all the legal rights and
responsibilities that were relinquished by the biological par-
ent(s).3 1
The requirement of a "cut-off' provision is problematic
when one of the biological parents wishes to retain legal cus-
tody over the child. Such is the case when one parent desires
to remarry, or marry for the first time, and the new spouse
32
wishes to adopt the child. Before legislative changes permit-
ted stepparent adoptions,33 courts would commonly overlook
the statutorily-required "cut-off' provision and allow the
adoption to proceed.3 ' However, the other birth parent's legal
rights may be terminated by the stepparent adoption, thereby
ensuring that the child will have only two legal parents. 5
30. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936-37; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §
8617 (Deering 2004) ("The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time
of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility
for, the adopted child, and have no right over the child."); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
117-1(a) (McKinney 2004) ("[Alfter the making of an order of adoption the birth
parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and
of all responsibilities for and shall have no rights over such adoptive
child ....").
31. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616 (Deering 2004) ("After adoption, the
adopted child and the adoptive parents shall sustain towards each other the le-
gal relationship of parent and child and have all the rights and are subject to all
the duties of that relationship."); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117-1(c) (McKinney
2004) ("The adoptive parents or parent and the adoptive child shall sustain to-
ward each other the legal relation of parent and child and shall have all the
rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation including the rights of in-
heritance from and through each other and the birth and adopted kindred of the
adopted parents or parent.").
32. The new spouse cannot be the biological parent. If that were the case,
there would be no need for adoption unless that parent had previously relin-
quished his or her parental rights.
33. California changed its laws in 1994 to accommodate stepparent
adoptions. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 9000-07 (Deering 2004 and Supp. 2005).
Stepparent adoptions may be the most popular form of adoption in the United
States. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 937.
34. As early as 1925, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of
severance of parental rights in a stepparent adoption. Marshall v. Marshall,
239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925). The court held that despite the statutory provision re-
quiring termination of the birth parent's rights prior to any adoption, the step-
parent adoption did not sever the birth mother's rights when her new spouse
adopted the children. Id. at 38. The court declared that the stepparent adop-
tion was valid and that the birth mother retained her parental rights and re-
sponsibilities. Id.
35. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 938. In some situations, a child may be
raised by three adults: the child's two biological parents and the partner of one
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 46
2. Second-Parent Adoptions
In the past decade, an increasing number of gay and les-
bian couples have sought to raise children together,36 result-
ing in a movement to win adoption rights for families with
same-sex parents.3 7 Same-sex parents have pushed for sec-
ond-parent adoptions because the legal status of being an
adoptive parent or adoptive child carries with it many bene-
fits. For instance, the adoptive parent will have the same
rights as the biological parent, including the ability to consent
to life-saving emergency medical procedures for the child.3
By virtue of an adoption, the child may also become eligible
for the adoptive parent's health insurance, life insurance or
disability benefits, and any possible inheritance from the
adoptive parent.39 Without an adoption, neither the child nor
the adoptive parent is afforded any of these rights.40
of the biological parents. The law does not yet permit a child to have three legal
parents. See Pamela Gatos, Note, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay
Families, 26 VT. L. REV. 195, 196 (2001).
36. Reports indicate that the total number of children nationwide living
with at least one gay parent ranges from six to fourteen million. See ACLU
Fact Sheet: Overview of Lesbian and Gay Parenting, Adoption and Foster Care,
http://www.aclu.orgLesbianGayRights/LesbianGayRights.cfm?ID=9212&c=104
(1999).
37. Currently, seven states (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia have ap-
proved second parent adoption for gay and lesbian parents either by statute or
appellate court ruling. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation Second-
Parent Adoption/Stepparent Adoption Laws in the U.S.,
http://www.hrc.org/yourcommunity (follow "Second Parent/Stepparent Adoption
Laws in the U.S." hyperlink) (2003) [hereinafter Human Rights Campaign
Foundation]. California has also modified its stepparent adoption laws to in-
clude domestic partners who have registered in the state domestic partner reg-
istry. See CAL. FAm. CODE. § 9000 (Deering 2004 and Supp. 2005). The move-
ment to win adoption rights for same-sex parents is made more difficult because
circuit courts have declined to deem the right to adopt as a fundamental right.
See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1277
(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) (upholding Florida's ban on
adoption by homosexuals because adoption is not a fundamental right, nor is
sexual orientation a basis for suspect classification). See also Mullins v. Oregon,
57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir.
1989).
38. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 935.
39. See id.
40. Although Vermont's civil union statute establishes a presumption that
the members of the civil union are the parents of a child born into the union, it
is possible that other states will not recognize the presumption due to the De-
fense of Marriage Act. Therefore, it may be less risky to seek a second-parent
adoption than rely on presumptions afforded by state laws. See Mark Strasser,
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Adoption also provides for the emotional well-being of the
child.4 Should the couple separate or the biological parent
die, the non-legal parent would have no standing to ask for
custody or visitation rights without a legal adoption.4 2 The
absence of the non-legal parent may have a tremendous psy-
chological impact on the child, who has likely developed an
emotional bond with this parent.43 In both situations, the
child is the one who ultimately suffers the emotional and psy-
chological impact of "losing" the non-legal parent.44 Addition-
ally, the potential conflict arising out of a custody battle be-
tween the non-legal parent and the biological parent's
relatives may adversely impact the child's well-being.45
Because of the legal benefits offered by adoption, state
legislatures and courts have sought ways to allow same-sex
parents to adopt. Stepparent adoptions cannot be used by
same-sex couples because they are not permitted to marry.46
As a result, gay and lesbian advocates around the United
States have encouraged both courts and state legislatures to
change the laws governing adoption.47  Through these advo-
cacy efforts, "second-parent adoptions," which are similar to
stepparent adoptions, have emerged in the past decade.48
To keep up with the rapidly changing landscape of family
When is a Parent not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presumptions of
Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 323 (2001).
41. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936.
42. See Guardianship of Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 50-51 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (declaring that a former lesbian partner was not entitled to visitation
rights); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that a former partner lacked standing to seek custody of or visitation
with the child of an ex-partner); Schacter, supra note 8, at 936; see also Taylor,
supra note 2. But see Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), No. 75626-1,
2005 Wash. LEXIS 861, at *3 (Wash. 2005) (granting de facto parents the right
to petition for a determination of legal parentage); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711
N.E.2d 886, 892-93 (Mass. 1999) (granting the former partner of a lesbian bio-
logical mother visitation rights based on the best interests of the child stan-
dard).
43. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936.
44. See Daniel Pollack & Susan Mason, Mandatory Visitation: In the Best
Interest of the Child, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 74 (2004), available at
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/to/fcre/42/1 (follow "Mandatory Visitation"
pdf hyperlink); see also Schacter, supra note 8, at 936.
45. See Pollack & Mason, supra note 44, at 74.
46. See supra Part II.A.1.
47. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re
B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); see also Schacter, supra note 8, at 935.
48. See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 860-61 (D.C. 1995).
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law, courts have devised creative ways of permitting same-sex
couples to adopt children.49  Some courts analogize second-
parent adoptions to stepparent adoptions because, in both
situations, the child's custodial and biological parent does not
wish to surrender his or her right to the child.5 ° Courts have
applied the same rationale used to validate stepparent adop-
tions in recognizing second-parent adoptions. 51 This has al-
lowed the courts to overlook or excuse the requirement of the
"cut-off' provision.52
Another method of overcoming the "cut-off' provision is
through the use of statutory construction.53 To justify not en-
forcing the provision, some courts follow the rule that stat-
utes should not be interpreted so as to produce absurd re-
sults. 54  Courts following this approach reason that strictly
construing adoption laws to terminate the rights of a parent
who intends to raise a child jointly with an adoptive parent
would produce the absurd results that courts seek to avoid.55
Therefore, in a situation where the non-biological parent
wishes to adopt, these courts have held that the "cut-off'
provision is no longer mandatory, especially if adoption is in
the best interests of the child.56
However, not all courts have been willing to overlook the
"cut-off' requirement, perhaps because of the sensitive nature
49. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 938-39.
50. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at 860.
51. See id.
52. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 561 (holding that
termination of a birth parent's rights is not a mandatory prerequisite to every
adoption and that second-parent adoptions are valid under California's inde-
pendent adoption laws); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1273 (holding that the birth
mother's parental rights need not be terminated if the children are to be raised
with the help of the mother's partner).
53. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 938.
54. See In re Estate of Evans, 135 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Wis. 1965).
55. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 938; see also In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d at
860-61; In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d at 1272-74.
56. In In re B.L.V.B., the probate court initially denied the adoption because
the proposed adoptive mother "[did] not satisfy the statutory prerequisite to
adoption." In re B.L.VB, 628 A.2d at 1271. The Vermont Supreme Court held
that enforcing the termination of the birth mother's rights under the Vermont
statute would reach an "absurd result." Id. at 1273. It would also be inconsis-
tent with the best interests of the children and public policy of Vermont to en-
force the requirement. Id.
In a recent California decision, the California Supreme Court held that termi-
nation of parental rights is not a mandatory prerequisite to every valid adop-
tion. Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 561.
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of gay and lesbian rights.5 7  Many courts have strictly ad-
hered to state statutory requirements and have refused to
grant second-parent adoptions because of same-sex couples'
failure to meet these requirements. 5
An increasing number of states have been granting sec-
ond-parent adoptions. Currently, seven states plus the Dis-
trict of Columbia permit second-parent adoptions,5 9 and as
many as eighteen other states have granted these adoptions
at the trial court level.60  The second-parent adoptions
granted by these trial courts may be awaiting appellate court
rulings. However, appellate courts in four states have ruled
against permitting second-parent or stepparent adoption by
same-sex couples.61
B. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
1. History of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause ("the Clause") was de-
signed for the purpose of creating a unified nation out of sev-
eral different states.62 It provides that "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
57. See In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
58. Some courts have viewed the cut-off requirement as critical evidence
that the legislature did not intend to authorize second-parent adoptions. See,
e.g., In re Angel Lace, 516 N.W.2d at 684. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that because the Wisconsin legislature had specifically exempted stepparent
adoptions from the "cut-off" provision, the legislature had indicated its intent
not to extend the exemption any further. Id.
59. Because courts have recognized second-parent adoptions through statu-
tory interpretation and not constitutional adjudication, state legislatures may
overturn any judicially recognized second-parent adoption. However, there has
been no evidence thus far that any state legislature has taken such action. See
Schacter, supra note 8, at 945.
60. Human Rights Campaign Foundation, supra note 37. In these states,
second-parent adoptions have only been approved in certain counties, meaning
that a higher state court or the state legislature could invalidate them. Id.
61. Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin currently do not permit sec-
ond-parent adoptions. Id. There may be other options for same-sex couples in
states that do not allow second-parent or stepparent adoptions, such as through
civil union or domestic partnership rights. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 40, at
311. However, states that do not permit second-parent adoptions for same-sex
couples are unlikely to recognize the rights of gay families.
62. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 65, at 263.
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thereof."63
The dispute surrounding this clause has focused on
whether the Framers intended unification to be achieved di-
rectly through the Clause or through the power delegated to
Congress.64 History suggests that the first sentence of the
Clause gives the states a narrow command to admit properly
authenticated copies of sister-state judgments into evidence.65
These authenticated documents are to be accepted as prima
facie proof of a valid judgment. 66 An alternative view is that
the first sentence of the Clause contains choice-of-law and ju-
risdictional commands to the states.6 7  These commands re-
quire states to enforce the statutes, records, and judgments of
other states, and specify when and to what extent the en-
forcement needs to occur.68 The modern decisions addressing
the Clause support the view that the first sentence of the
Clause contains some minimal choice-of-law commands to the
states.69
The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
grants Congress the power to prescribe rules for authenticat-
ing state public acts, records, and judgments. 7' Furthermore,
it gives Congress the power to prescribe what effect these
public acts, records, and judgments should have in other
states.7 Congress first exercised its power under the second
sentence of the Clause by enacting the Full Faith and Credit
implementing statute in 1790.72 The most recent exercise of
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
64. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 65, at 263.
65. See id. at 264. The Clause also requires states to admit properly au-
thenticated copies of sister-state statutes and official records as proof that these
documents existed and dealt with the matters contained in the authenticated
copy. Id.
66. See id. See also id. § 67 for a more detailed history about the impact of
the 1790 implementing statute.
67. See id. § 65, at 264.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 65, at 264.
71. See id.
72. Act of May 26. 1790. ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (1790) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2000)). The implementing statute was amended to its present
form in 1948. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 65, at 265.
The current form of the statute sets forth the proper standards for authentica-
tion of records and judicial proceedings. It states that "[s]uch Acts, records and
judicial proceedings or copies thereof... shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States... as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State... from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
180 [Vol: 46
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congressional power under the Clause occurred in 1996, when
the controversial Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") was en-
acted.73
Case law has consistently held that states must give full
faith and credit to valid judgments rendered in sister states."
In 1813, the United States Supreme Court held that a prop-
erly authenticated state judgment should have the "same ef-
fect" in other states as it would have in the state that ren-
dered the judgment. 7' This Court decision set forth the "same
effect" rule, subject to certain exceptions.76 These exceptions
occur when the judgment would be enforceable in the judg-
ment-rendering state, but not in the judgment-enforcing
state.77 The Court made clear, however, that a state may not
refuse to enforce a judgment of another state simply because
the judgment violates the public policy of the judgment-
enforcing state.78
This doctrine was further articulated in Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 79 a case involving a contract governed by Mississippi
law, but with a judgment rendered by a Missouri court."0 In
that case, the Mississippi courts refused to enforce the judg-
ment rendered by the Missouri court.8 " In addressing the is-
sue of enforcement, the United States Supreme Court held
that enforcement of the judgment could not be refused on the
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). DOMA allows states to refuse to give effect to
any "public act, record, or judicial proceeding" of another state that treats a re-
lationship between people of the same sex as a marriage. Id.
74. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998); Williams v.
North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 481 (1813).
75. See Mills, 11 U.S. at 484. Justice Story acknowledged that Congress
used evidentiary terms in the 1790 implementing statute, but concluded that
Congress intended to address what "effect" state judgments should have in
other states. Id.
76. See Whitten, Choice of Law, supra note 11, at 841-42. Examples of "true
exceptions" include "judgments barred by the statute of limitations of the judg-
ment-enforcing state applicable to foreign judgments and so-called 'pena judg-
ments' of other states." See id. Other exceptions, which are not "true excep-
tions," are related to res judicata doctrines and include traditional methods of
collateral attack on a judgment, such as lack of subject matter or personal juris-
diction. See id.
77. See id. at 842.
78. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 67, at 271.
79. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
80. Id. at 233-34.
81. Id. at 234.
2005]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
grounds that it violated Mississippi's public policy.82 As long
as the judgment-rendering court had proper subject matter 3
and personal jurisdiction, 4 the judgment was valid in Mis-
souri and had to be given full faith and credit ("same effect")
in Mississippi. 5
2. The Full Faith and Credit Clause as Applied to
Divorce Decrees-the Williams Cases
In understanding how courts might construe second-
parent adoptions in light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
it is helpful to examine how the Clause has been applied in
other areas of family law. Although the Williams cases 6 con-
cern interstate recognition of divorce decrees, they "establish
interstate marital status recognition doctrines that are rele-
vant, suggest jurisdictional principles that are potentially
significant, and illustrate interstate comity principles that
are profoundly pertinent to the growing debate over same-sex
marriage recognition."" Furthermore, because marriage, di-
vorce, and adoption are important public policy concerns for
each state, the Williams cases provide a helpful comparison of
divorce decrees and adoption decrees.
In Williams I, 8 the Court addressed the question of
whether North Carolina was required to recognize Nevada
divorce decrees issued to two individuals who had been previ-
ously married to separate spouses.89 In 1940, Otis Williams
82. Id. at 237. The Court held that even if the Missouri judgment was
based on a misapplication of Mississippi law, the Mississippi court could not re-
fuse enforcement. Id.
83. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the jurisdiction that a certain court
has over a class of cases under the constitution and laws governing the court
system of a state. See Whitten, Choice of Law, supra note 11, at 818.
84. Personal jurisdiction refers to the power of the court "to bring a person
into its adjudicative process" and the jurisdiction that the court maintains over
the individual's "personal rights, rather than merely over property interests."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).
85. Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237.
86. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 11), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Wil-
liams v. North Carolina (William.s 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Like adoption, di-
vorce proceedings are handled through the court system, with a court issuing a
final divorce order, provided subject matter and personal jurisdiction are
proper. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2338 (Deering 2004).
87. Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and
Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 188 (1998).
88. Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 287.
89. See id. at 292-93.
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and Lillie Shaver moved to Las Vegas, Nevada, where they
established a residence.9" At that time, each individual was
married to another person.91 Six weeks after moving to Las
Vegas, Williams and Shaver each filed for divorce from their
respective spouses in Nevada state court.9 2 After their di-
vorces were finalized, the two were married in Nevada.
Shortly thereafter, Williams and Shaver returned to North
Carolina, where they were indicted for bigamy on the grounds
that the Nevada divorce decrees were invalid.94 Both Wil-
liams and Shaver were convicted and sentenced to prison.9
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions, concluding that North Carolina was not required
to give the Nevada divorce decrees full faith and credit.96
In its review, the United States Supreme Court focused
on "whether the domiciliary state of one spouse could enter a
divorce decree entitled to full faith and credit in the state of
marital domicile where an abandoned spouse still lived." 97
Justice Douglas's majority opinion emphasized that full faith
and credit must be given to final divorce decree judgments. 9
While states are free to establish their own divorce policies
based on societal morals, the recognition of another state's
valid judgment must adhere to the Constitution. 99  The
90. See id. at 289. The question of whether Williams and Shaver were
properly domiciled in Nevada was the subject of Williams II. Williams 11, 325
U.S. at 266.
91. See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 289. Williams was married to Carrie Wyke
in 1916 and had lived with her for twenty-four years. See id. Shaver had been
married to Thomas Hendrix for twenty years prior to establishing residence
with Williams. See id.
92. Id. at 289.
93. See id. at 290.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 289.
96. Id. at 291.
97. Wardle, supra note 87, at 192. The Court recognized that the issue be-
fore it was not whether a North Carolina court could refuse to give full faith and
credit to a Nevada divorce decree simply because it disagreed with the Nevada
court's finding. See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 302. The Nevada court found that
Williams and Shaver had adequately established their domicile in Nevada. Id.
98. See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 299, 303.
99. See id. at 303. A public policy exception exists with regard to state stat-
utes, as "[tihe Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state to substi-
tute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject mat-
ter concerning which it is competent to legislate.'" Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
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Court's opinion stated:
When a court of one state acting in accord with the re-
quirements of procedural due process alters the marital
status of one domiciled in that state by granting him a di-
vorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree
should be excepted from the full faith and credit clause
merely because its enforcement or recognition in another
statue would conflict with the policy of the latter.1
00
Further, the Court emphasized the potential policy impli-
cations of a state's refusal to recognize valid divorce decrees
rendered by a sister state. 101 There was strong concern about
the problems that would result if an individual remarried
without being aware that his or her previous marriage was
still valid."0 2 A rule that would permit one state to refuse to
recognize another state's final judgments could cause "con-
siderable disaster to innocent persons' and 'bastardize chil-
dren hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage,'
or else encourage collusive divorces."'0 '
Justice Douglas also stressed the difference between a
state's need to recognize another state's court judgment, as
opposed to another state's statutes, and emphasized the im-
portance of recognizing the former.0 4 He explained that ad-
herence to the Full Faith and Credit Clause was necessary to
alter "'the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties' by making them 'integral parts of a single na-
tion."' 5 Therefore, it was crucial that states comply with the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in order to create a cohesive na-
tion. 106
The Supreme Court remanded the case'0 7 and North
100. Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 303. Justice Douglas also noted that "[t]hus
even though the cause of action could not be entertained in the state of the fo-
rum either because it had been barred by the local statute of limitations or con-
travened local policy, the judgment thereon obtained in a sister state is entitled
to full faith and credit." Id. at 294.
101. See id. at 300-01.
102. id. at 299.
103. Id. at 301 (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
104. See id. at 302-04; supra text accompanying note 101.
105. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 295 (quoting Milwaukee County v. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935)).
106. See id. at 303.
107. Id. at 304.
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Carolina then brought a second suit against Williams and
Shaver. l10 In Williams H, North Carolina claimed that the
divorce judgments were invalid, not on the basis of full faith
and credit issues, but because Williams and Shaver had not
legitimately established their domicile in Nevada. 109 Under
this theory, North Carolina argued that the Nevada courts
lacked jurisdiction to issue the divorce decrees. 110 At trial, the
jury found Williams and Shaver guilty of bigamy."' The sub-
sequent appellate courts upheld the convictions, and the case
once again came before the United States Supreme Court.'12
The majority opinion" 3 framed the issue in Williams H as
whether North Carolina could refuse to honor the Nevada di-
vorce decrees because North Carolina found that the parties
had not established domicile in Nevada." 4 In upholding the
convictions, the Court stated that there was ample evidence
that Williams and Shaver were not domiciled in Nevada, and
therefore the divorce decree was wrongfully issued because
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the couple." 5
The Williams cases are an important precedent when
considering future applications of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. These decisions show that regardless of a state's pub-
lic policy concerns regarding divorce, the state must still rec-
ognize a valid divorce decree issued by a sister state. Al-
though these cases concern interstate recognition of divorce
decrees, the same considerations should apply to properly is-
sued adoption decrees.
108. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 325 U.S. 226, 226 (1945).
109. See id. at 227.
110. See id. Establishment of domicile in one state implies a nexus between
the individual and the state so that the state can control legal relations and re-
sponsibilities that are crucial to the functioning of society. See id. at 229. With-
out domicile, the state lacks the power to render a divorce decree. See id.
111. See id. at 227. By the time the second trial commenced, Otis's former
wife had already passed away and Lillie's husband had obtained a North Caro-
lina divorce decree and remarried. See Wardle, supra note 87, at 202.
112. See Wardle, supra note 87, at 202.
113. Justice Frankfurter, who wrote a concurring opinion in Williams I,
wrote the majority opinion in Williams H, while Justice Douglas, the author of
the majority opinion in Williams I, joined Justice Black's dissenting opinion in
Williams II. Williams H, 325 U.S. at 227, 261 (Black, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 227.
115. Id. at 234.
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3. Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages-the
Defense of Marriage Act
Although not directly related to adoption, the
controversial Defense of Marriage Act 116 may impact the
policy debate over recognition of same-sex adoptions.
Enacted by Congress," 7 the statute allows states to refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages that other states have
authorized."' The text of DOMA provides that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, terri-
tory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage un-
der the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
119
The inclusion of "judicial proceeding[s]" in DOMA has
caused much controversy within the legal community. 20
Some legal scholars argue that by including judicial proceed-
ings in DOMA, Congress has rendered DOMA unconstitu-
tional because it directly conflicts with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.' 2 ' Others argue that it is necessary to consider
judicial proceedings as part of DOMA in order to avoid the
use of a declaratory judgment to validate same-sex mar-
riages. 22 For example, if Hawaii were to recognize same-sex
marriages, same-sex couples could establish their domicile in
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
117. Some scholars believe that Congress did not possess the constitutional
authority to pass DOMA. See Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Dis-
aster: on DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and Credit Jurisprudence,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 307 (1998). But see Wardle, supra note 87, at 219-33 (argu-
ing that Congress had the power to enact DOMA).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
119. Id.
120. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 310-13; Whitten, Original Understand-
ing, supra note 10, at 346-94.
121. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 350. Strasser suggests that Congress is
given the power to prescribe how much credit is due to state judgments, as long
as it does not "attempt to circumvent the explicit constitutional requirement
that full faith and credit be given." Id.
122. Id. at 342-45. Use of declaratory judgments has been suggested as a
method of validating the needs of those who "wish to adopt outside 'normal
adoption proceedings.'" See Casey Martin, Comment, Equal Opportunity Adop-
tion & Declaratory Judgments: Acting in a Child's Best Interest, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 569, 584-87 (2003).
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Hawaii, marry, and subsequently seek declaratory judg-
ments 23 in Hawaii state courts to affirm the validity of their
marriages. 124  A declaratory judgment would have the full
force and effect of a final judgment and be subject to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. 125
C. History and Current Status of the Oklahoma Statute and
Finstuen v. Edmondson
The Oklahoma statute refusing to recognize adoptions by
same-sex couples ("section 7502-1.4")126 was passed in the
spring of 2004 as part of a bill addressing foreign adoption is-
sues. 27 There is little, if any, legislative history or publicly
available information on the debate conducted prior to section
7502-1.4's enactment. 128  However, societal opposition to ho-
mosexuality in Oklahoma may have assured its passage, es-
pecially in the wake of a referendum banning gay marriage in
Oklahoma. 129
The enactment of section 7502-1.4 may have been
prompted by a March 2004 opinion issued by Oklahoma At-
torney General Drew Edmondson pertaining to birth certifi-
cates of children raised by same-sex parents. 30 The opinion
123. A declaratory judgment may be issued when "an actual controversy has
existed which requires a judgment to determine legal rights and relations."
Demorest v. DiPentima, 324 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). See also
Strasser, supra note 117, at 342-45.
124. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 342-45.
125. See id. at 345. There is some controversy about requiring full faith and
credit in the case of equity judgments. See id. at 343. However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has stated that "[t]he Court has never placed equity decrees out-
side the full faith and credit domain." Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.
222, 234 (1998).
126. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (West Supp. 2004).
127. See Amy Fagan, Same-Sex Adoption Negated in State; Oklahoma Law
Reverses Ruling, WASH. TIMES (Wash., D.C.), May 7, 2004, at A05.
128. A search of the Oklahoma State Legislature's website failed to reveal
'any legislative history. Oklahoma State Legislature, http://www.lsb.state.ok.us
(last visited Aug. 31, 2005). See also Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1,
at $ 23.
129. See Fagan, supra note 128; Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at
23 (quoting State Senator James Williamson's purpose in proposing the
amendment to Oklahoma section 7502-1.4: "[t]he key component of the radical
homosexual agenda is to take away the right of states to regulate and define
adoptions just as they are trying to redefine marriage across the nation.").
130. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 04-008 (2004), available at 2004 WL 557472;
see also Fagan, supra note 127 (describing how Attorney General Drew
Edmondson's decision was overturned by section 7502-1.4).
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concluded that if a child is born in Oklahoma and is adopted
in another state by a same-sex couple, Oklahoma must recog-
nize the adoption.13 1 Furthermore, Oklahoma would then be
required to issue an adoptive birth certificate for the child,
listing both same-sex partners as parents.132 The Attorney
General's opinion stated that pursuant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, an out-of-state adoption decree must be given
the same legal effect in Oklahoma as it would in the state
that issued the decree. 133
In an effort to circumvent the Attorney General's opin-
ion,13 1 the Oklahoma legislature revised section 7502-1.4, the
statute that specifically addresses the adoption recognition
requirements. 35 Less than six months after the law was en-
acted, Magro and Finstuen filed a lawsuit challenging section
7502-1.4 on constitutional grounds. 36 The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment stating that section 7502-1.4 violates
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and hinders their
constitutional right to travel. 137 All of the plaintiffs are same-
sex couples who have adopted children through second-parent
adoptions and are either living in, or wish to visit, Okla-
homa. 138
Along with Magro and Finstuen, two other couples have
joined the lawsuit challenging section 7502-1.4. Greg Hampel
131. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 04-008, supra note 130, at 16.
132. See id.
133. See id. Prior to amendment in 2004, section 7502-1.4 stated:
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final or-
der creating the relationship of parent and child by adoption, issued by
a court or other governmental authority with appropriate jurisdiction
in a foreign country or in another state or territory of the United
States. The rights and obligations of the parties as to matters within
the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as though the decree,
judgment, or final order were issued by a court of this state.
Id.
134. See House of Realty, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 109 P.3d 314, 320
(Okla. 2004) (stating that an opinion issued by the Attorney General construing
a statute has persuasive authority). Therefore, by virtue of amending section
7502-1.4, the Oklahoma legislature attempted to ameliorate the effects of the
Opinion.
135. See Fagan, supra note 127.
136. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 2004 WL 3139176 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2004)
(No. 04-CV1152).
137. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 1$ 26-40, 47-50.
138. Id. at $ 13-15.
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and Ed Swaya, 139 residents of Washington, adopted their
daughter Vivian in an "open adoption," where the adopting
family continues to maintain a relationship with the birth
mother. 14  The couple is now hesitant to bring Vivian into
Oklahoma to visit her biological mother because of the risk
that the State will refuse to recognize the adoptive parents'
rights14
Lucy and Jennifer Doel, the adoptive parents of Ellie,
who was born in Oklahoma, 42 have also joined in the lawsuit.
The Doels, who are registered domestic partners under Cali-
fornia law,143 agreed to adopt Ellie when her biological par-
ents could no longer care for her."4  Though the adoptions
were finalized in California,145 the family has since moved to
Oklahoma. 146 Lucy and Jennifer have applied for a birth cer-
tificate in Oklahoma that would properly identify them both
as Ellie's legal parents, but the language of the statute may
bar the issuance of such a document. 147
The case is currently set for a bench trial in February
2006.141 Previously, Oklahoma had asked that the lawsuit be
dismissed on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment 49
139. Before the new Oklahoma statute was passed, Hampel and Swaya had
asked the State of Oklahoma to issue an amended birth certificate in accord
with a Washington court's adoption decree listing both men as parents of their
adopted daughter. Lambda Legal, Federal Judge Says Lawsuit Seeking to
Strike Down Oklahoma's Antigay Adoption Law Can Proceed (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.lambdalegal.orgcgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1576. Okla-
homa Attorney General Drew Edmondson, a named defendant in Finstuen, is-
sued an opinion stating that Oklahoma must issue amended birth certificates
upon receipt of a certified copy of the adoption order. Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 04-
008, supra note 130, at 14.
140. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at $ 14. Hampel and Swaya
became Vivian's legal parents under a valid adoption decree issued by the State
of Washington in August 2002. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 15.
143. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 298.5 (Deering 2004).
144. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 15.
145. Id. Lucy Doel was the first to adopt Ellie and was issued an Order of
Adoption by the Los Angeles Superior Court in January 2002. Id. Jennifer
Doel later adopted Ellie under the procedure for adoption by a domestic partner,
which grants the same rights as a stepparent adoption in California. Id. Jenni-
fer Doel's adoption of Ellie was finalized in June 2002. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Scheduling Order at 1, Finstuen v. Edmondson (W.D. Okla. July 7,
2005) (No. CIV-04-1152C) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
149. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the
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prohibits individuals from suing a state in federal court.15
The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss,' and
the State appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit. 52 The
court of appeals recently dismissed Oklahoma's Eleventh
Amendment claim, 5 3 allowing the case to move forward.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
With an increasing population of children parented by
same-sex couples, the need to create legal ties among these
family members is becoming critical. Many state legislatures
and courts have recognized the need to create a legal bond be-
tween children and parents by approving legislation permit-
ting second-parent adoptions. 54 However, in light of the so-
cietal attitudes in the United States toward homosexuality,
the stability of these families is threatened by legislation such
as that enacted in Oklahoma.
The passage of laws similar to section 7502-1.415  may
have devastating effects on the stability of same-sex families.
Each state is entitled to set forth its own policies with regard
to gay marriage or the right of same-sex couples to adopt.
156
However, the refusal to recognize valid adoptions rendered in
other states raises issues of compliance with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the Constitution. As a result, by cross-
ing state lines a child may suddenly have only one legal
guardian or no guardian at all.
The enactment of DOMA may also permit states to refuse
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
150. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction at 1, Finstuen v.
Edmondson (W.D. Okla. Oct. 13, 2004) (No. CIV-04-1152C) (on file with the
Santa Clara Law Review).
151. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
Finstuen v. Edmondson (W.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2004) (No. CIV-04-1152C) (on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review).
152. Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-1152C (W.D. Okla. 2004), appeal
docketed, No. 04-6395 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2004) (on file with the Santa Clara
Law Review).
153. Order Dismissing Appeal, Finstuen v. Edmondson (10th Cir. May 4,
2005) (No. 04-6395) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
154. See supra text accompanying note 37.
155. See supra Part i.
156. See generally Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 303
(1942).
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recognition of second-parent adoptions that result from a
same-sex couple's relationship, such as a civil union or do-
mestic partnership. Although DOMA only allows states to re-
fuse recognition of rights arising under a same-sex marriage,
it is possible that a civil union or domestic partnership can be
likened to a marriage. Therefore, adoptions that result from
a civil union or domestic partnership may be negated by
DOMA.
IV. ANALYSIS
To determine the constitutionality of the Oklahoma stat-
ute, the prior history and case law surrounding the Full Faith
and Credit Clause must be examined.157 In addition, the pub-
lic policy implications favoring enforcement of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause will be discussed.158 The importance of re-
quiring states to recognize valid second-parent adoptions will
also be addressed, 15 9 along with an analysis of the possible
implications that DOMA may have on the validity of second-
parent adoptions. 60
A. Constitutionality of the Oklahoma Statute
Throughout its history, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
has always required that states enforce the valid judgments
of sister states. 61  Even divorce decrees were subject to the
Clause, despite the fact that enforcing such decrees could vio-
late an important public policy of the judgment-enforcing
state. 62  Supporters of section 7502-1.4 argue that there
should be a public policy exception for valid state judg-
ments. 163 However, prior case law has not recognized such an
exception. 1' Therefore, states are required to give full faith
157. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
158. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
159. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
160. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
161. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
162. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942); see
also discussion supra Part II.B.2.
163. See Marie Price, More Seek to Join Gay-Adoption Suit, TULSA WORLD,
Nov. 10, 2004, at A10.
164. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). Although Baker
does not specifically address adoption decrees, the case made clear that states
are not free to refuse to give full faith and credit to the judgments of sister
states, even if enforcing those judgments would violate an important public pol-
icy of the enforcing state. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 307.
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and credit to judgments of sister states, even when they vio-
late an important public policy of the state. 165 The Supreme
Court has been consistent in its enforcement of the Clause
and has reiterated that there is "no roving 'public policy ex-
ception' to the full faith and credit due judgments."'66
The history surrounding the Full Faith and Credit
Clause suggests that section 7502-1.4 will not pass constitu-
tional muster. 67 As early as 1813, the United States Su-
preme Court found that state judgments should have the
same effect in other states as they have in the judgment-
rendering state. 6 ' This doctrine was reiterated in 1908 when
the Supreme Court specifically stated that a sister-state
judgment could not be refused enforcement on the grounds
that it violated public policy.'6 9 Within the last ten years, the
Supreme Court has again upheld this principle.1 70
Supporters of section 7502-1.4 may argue that because
adoption concerns the family, it should not be subject to the
same laws that govern creditor 171 or contract judgments, 172 or
injunctions. 173 However, the Supreme Court addressed the
intersection of family law issues and Full Faith and Credit
Clause principles in the Williams cases.1 74  Although these
cases dealt with divorce proceedings, their underlying family
law principles would seem equally applicable in the adoption
context.
In Williams I, Justice Douglas's. majority opinion repeat-
edly emphasized that states cannot refuse to recognize an-
other state's divorce decree merely because it would conflict
with state policy preferences. 7 5 In deciding whether a state
has the right to disregard another state's valid adoption de-
cree, the issue is which state's public policy should be en-
forced. Williams I states that the public policy of the judg-
165. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 222.
166. Id. at 223.
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
168. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
169. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
170. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
171. See Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 481.
172. See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 233.
173. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 226.
174. See Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287, 287 (1947);
Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); see also discus-
sion supra Part II.B.2.
175. See Williams 1, 317 U.S. at 294, 303.
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ment-rendering state should be enforced.176 There is very lit-
tle support in the case law for the creation of a public policy
exception to the enforcement of valid state judgments.177
Much of Justice Douglas's majority opinion focused on
distinguishing Williams I from Haddock v. Haddock.7 ' In
Haddock, a wife in New York brought a lawsuit for separa-
tion and alimony against her husband, who had moved to
Connecticut. 179  The husband claimed he was already di-
vorced, based upon on a divorce decree granted by the State of
Connecticut, where he had established a domicile.1 8 ' The
Court held that New York need not give full faith and credit
to the Connecticut divorce decree because the wife was served
only by publication and had not entered an appearance in the
divorce proceeding."18
Haddock did not establish a public policy exception for
divorce decrees.8 2 Rather, full faith and credit was not given
to the Connecticut divorce decree because there was no per-
sonal jurisdiction over the wife.8 3 However, to be safe, Wil-
liams I explicitly overruled Haddock8  and reiterated the
"same effects" doctrine found in prior case law. 8 5
The same reasoning found in Williams I applies to adop-
tion decrees. Both adoption and divorce are matters of great
importance to society, as they contribute to the definition of a
family. Because the Supreme Court has already refused to
create a public policy exception for divorce decrees, it would
be logical to assume the Court will follow this precedent with
176. Id.
177. But see Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). Note, however, that
Haddock was clearly overturned by Williams I, and Justice Douglas made a
clear distinction between the two cases. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 293-99. Lack of
personal jurisdiction over the wife-not a public policy exception-was the basis
for allowing New York to refuse to recognize the divorce decree issued by Con-
necticut. Id. at 297.
178. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 562; see Williams I, 317 U.S. at 293-97.
179. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 564.
180. Id. at 565-66.
181. Id. at 567.
182. See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 296.
183. See id. at 297. Without personal jurisdiction, the Connecticut court
could not render a binding judgment against the wife. See id. Lack of personal
jurisdiction over a party is not a "true exception" to the "same effect" rule be-
cause it can be used to challenge any judgment. See supra note 76 and accom-
panying text.
184. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 304.
185. See id. at 303.
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respect to adoption decrees. 18 6
The principles established in the Williams cases with re-
spect to divorce decrees are applicable to adoption decrees be-
cause both are accomplished through court proceedings."8 7
The adoption process consists of a state judicial proceeding to
determine whether the statutory requirements for adoption
have been met.' 8 If a court determines that all statutory re-
quirements for the adoption have been complied with and the
adoption is in the best interests of the child,8 9 the court will
issue an adoption order.19 ° The Williams cases show that fail-
ure to recognize second-parent adoptions would be contrary to
established case law.
Based upon the above reasons, it would be difficult for
Oklahoma to defend section 7502-1.4 against attack under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Even the Oklahoma Attor-
ney General came to the conclusion that adoption decrees
must be given full faith and credit pursuant to the Constitu-
tion. 9' Aside from potential relief under DOMA, 9 2 Oklahoma
may be unable to find a viable argument to defend the consti-
tutionality of the statute.
Case law, both old and new, has held that full faith and
credit must be given to valid judgments of sister states.'93
Adoption decrees are issued by a court and should be given
the same protection as divorce decrees.
B. Public Policy Reasons for Enforcing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause
Aside from constitutional reasons, there are policy rea-
186. The Supreme Court has even refused to create a public policy exception
for judgments obtained through litigation. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S. 222, 226 (1998); Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U.S. 230, 233 (1908); Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,481 (1813).
187. See supra note 86.
188. See Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be
Recognized By Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite
Anti-Marriage Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U.
L. REV. 751, 804 (2003).
189. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612 (Deering 2004).
190. See, e.g., id.
191. Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 04-008, supra note 130, at 14. See discussion su-
pra note 134.
192. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
193. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 226 (1998); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 233 (1908); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 481
(1813).
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sons for continued enforcement of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. One of the original purposes behind the United
States Constitution was to integrate the states into a more
cohesive union. 194 That same policy objective still exists to-
day.
As stated numerous times by Justice Douglas in Williams
I, the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit clause is to unite
the several states into a united nation. 195 The Clause "was
adopted to 'guard the new political and economic union
against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in juris-
prudence."'196
Although the United States has changed dramatically
both socially and economically since the signing of the Consti-
tution, the same principles articulated by Justice Douglas
should govern current court judgments. Allowing states to re-
fuse recognition of another state's valid adoption judgment
could create numerous logistical problems. The lives of fami-
lies with same-sex parents would be dictated by each state's
policy on second-parent adoptions. These families would have
to plan their travels and employment decisions accordingly to
prevent the termination of their parental rights as they cross
state lines. This would interfere with their right to travel
within the United States.'97
Furthermore, allowing states to carve out public policy
exceptions to sister-state judgments may open the floodgates
to more litigation. Judgments rendered with both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction are final 98  because
"[litigation must end somewhere." 99 The Supreme Court has
noted that:
[the Full Faith and Credit Clause compels that controver-
sies be stilled so that where a state court has jurisdiction
of the parties and subject matter, its judgment controls in
194. See id. at 295.
195. See Cox, supra note 188, at 777.
196. Id. (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-the Lawyer's
Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17 (1945)).
197. See generally Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (holding that the
"right to travel" consists of "the right of a citizen of one [s]tate to enter and to
leave another [sitate," "the right to be treated as a welcome visitor" in the new
state, and the right to be treated like citizens of the new state upon electing to
become a permanent resident).
198. See Cox, supra note 188, at 777.
199. Id.
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other states to the same extent as it does in the state
where rendered .... By the constitutional provision for
full faith and credit, the local doctrines of res judicata,
speaking generally, become a part of national jurispru-
dence .... 200
A final adoption judgment in one state means that the is-
sues of the best interests of the child and the statutory re-
quirements for adoption cannot be re-litigated by another
state.20 1 This provides stability to the parties involved in the
litigation because it creates certainty in their legal rights.
Preventing re-litigation is perhaps even more important with
respect to adoption because of the emotional bonds between
the co-parent and the child.20 2
Additionally, if one state refuses to recognize adoption
judgments of another state, the state being refused may re-
taliate in kind. 0 3 By requiring all states to adhere to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, "[a]nything taken from a state by
way of freedom to deny faith and credit to law of others is
thereby added to the state by way of a right to exact faith and
credit of its own."20 4 One of the sovereign powers that a state
is forced to relinquish under the Constitution is "[t]he right to
adjudicate disputes in which courts of a sister state have al-
ready rendered judgment. In return, the state obtains the as-
surance that its own judgments will enjoy nationwide
force."2 5  The reciprocity that is required by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause assures equality between the states.20 6
200. Id. (quoting Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of
Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (1997)).
201. See id. A state can collaterally attack the adoption decree by challeng-
ing the original court's jurisdiction over the lawsuit and their ability to render a
judgment. See generally Whitten, Choice of Law, supra note 11, at 817. How-
ever, a collateral attack is very unlikely to succeed because there is usually per-
sonal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at
817-40.
202. See Cox, supra note 188, at 777.
203. See id. at 778.
204. Id. (quoting Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV. 604,
647 (1997)).
205. Id. (quoting Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Ju-
dicata and Full Faith and Credit, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47, 75 (2001)).
206. See id.
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C. Public Policy Arguments for Recognition of Second-Parent
Adoptions Across State Lines
Along with the broad problems that may occur if courts
allow exceptions to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, there
are many difficulties that will arise if second-parent adop-
tions are nullified in certain states. States that allow second-
parent adoptions have recognized that it is in the state's in-
terest to permit such adoptions.2 °7 In case of separation, such
adoptions would permit standing for both parents to request
child support from the non-custodial parent.208 If the biologi-
cal parent were to pass away, there would be no need for the
child to enter the already over-burdened foster care system.20 9
The state would also save money on litigation costs if the co-
parent challenges a court's award of custody to a biological
relative of the child.
More importantly, second-parent adoptions are in the
best interests of the child.210  Adoption proceedings are
slightly different than divorce proceedings because the best
interests of the child are always at the forefront. 211 An adop-
tion will not be granted unless the court finds that the adop-
tion is in the best interests of the child.212 If this requirement
is met, the child is then given the right to have two legal par-
ents, both of whom can make decisions for him or her.2 3 Both
legal parents would have rights to visitation and custody
should the couple decide to separate, just as heterosexual
couples do in a marriage.214 If there were no second-parent
adoptions, children of same-sex couples would be denied the
right to have two legal guardians.215
207. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 940-49.
208. See id., at 936; supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
209. In 1999, there were an estimated half-million children in foster care in
the United States, but only 20,000 qualified adoptive parents. See ACLU Fact
Sheet: Overview of Lesbian and Gay Parenting, Adoption and Foster Care, su-
pra note 36.
210. See Diana Lauretta, Comment, Protecting the Child's Best Interest: De-
fending Second-Parent Adoptions Granted Prior to the 2002 Enactment of Cali-
fornia Assembly Bill 25, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 173 (2003).
211. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612 (Deering 2004).
212. See, e.g., id.
213. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 936.
214. See id.
215. It is contradictory for a state to overlook the cut-off provision for step-
parent adoptions but not for same-sex couples since the same public policy ar-
guments support both. The children would be deprived of the right to have
2005]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Additionally, a state's refusal to comply with the Full
Faith and Credit Clause may result in extreme difficulties
and complications. As discussed in Williams I, a rule that al-
lows one state to ignore another state's final divorce judgment
would cause "considerable disaster to innocent persons and
bastardize children . . 216 Society has an interest "in the
protection of innocent offspring of marriages deemed legiti-
mate in other jurisdictions."217
Practically speaking, it is possible that section 7502-1.4
would have no effect on a same-sex family passing through
Oklahoma if no legal decisions needed to be made during the
family's time in the State. The statute does not take children
away from their families, but merely declares that the legal
rights between the child and parent are nullified temporarily
while in Oklahoma. However, parents are unlikely to risk
losing the recognition of their legal rights over their children.
Emergencies may occur where co-parents will suddenly be
unable to give consent to medical treatment because they do
not have the legal right to do so. In order to avoid such situa-
tions, these families may choose to restrict their travel and
choice of domicile within the United States, especially if more
states pass laws similar to section 7502-1.4.
If Oklahoma's statute is declared unconstitutional, it will
not affect the State's public policies toward same-sex adop-
tions. Oklahoma, being a sovereign state within the United
States, will still be permitted to enact legislation that prohib-
its same-sex marriage or adoption by same-sex partners.218
However, it is ironic that Oklahoma continues to adhere to a
"best interests of the child" approach to adoption,219 while re-
fusing to support adoptions that have been determined to be
in the best interests of the child by other states.
Because section 7502-1.4 runs contrary to the notion that
another legal guardian merely because they were being raised by parents of the
same sex.
216. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams P, 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
217. Id. at 303.
218. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503-1.1 (West Supp. 2004) (listing only
the husband or wife of the biological parent of the child as being eligible to
adopt). Florida and Mississippi have already enacted statutes that prevent
same-sex couples from adopting. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(d) (2004); MiSS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3 (2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
219. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7501-1.2 (West 1998).
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adoption is in the best interests of the child, 2 0 it should be
struck down. Promoting the best interests of the child is an
important public policy reason for granting second-parent
adoptions. 2 1  Second-parent adoptions provide stability for
the children of same-sex parents and prevent the penalization
of those raised in a non-traditional family. Section 7502-1.4
fails to take any of these crucial public policy considerations
into account and does not promote the best interests of the
child.
D. Implications of DOMA
Although DOMA does not expressly address adoption, it
is possible that some politicians and judges will construe
DOMA as a mandate against any rights conferred upon fami-
lies with same-sex parents. Cases calling for the interpreta-
tion of DOMA are still pending in the court system, and the
Supreme Court has yet to articulate how the statute should
be construed.222 One crucial issue surrounding DOMA is
whether it should apply only to same-sex marriages
performed contrary to the law of the domicile at the time of
the marriage, or to other marriages as well.223
Another lingering question under DOMA is whether all
states should acknowledge the benefits and rights that may
emanate from same-sex marriage.224 DOMA permits states to
refuse to give effect to "[any right or claim arising from] a re-
lationship between persons of the same sex [that is treated]
220. Most, if not all, adoption statutes are written such that the adoption
must be in the best interests of the child before it will be granted. See, e.g., CAL.
FAM. CODE § 8612 (Deering 2004).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
222. A federal judge recently dismissed a lawsuit filed by a lesbian couple in
Florida that wanted their Massachusetts marriage recognized in Florida. Bob
Egelko, Right to Reject Gay Rites [sic] Gets First OK / U.S. Judge Upholds Flor-
ida's Refusal of Massachusetts Law, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2005, at A14.
223. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 333. It is unclear whether only the law
of the domiciliary state of the couple at the time of marriage should apply. A
same-sex couple may get married in one state and live there for twenty years. If
they move somewhere else, to retire, for example, the new state may refuse to
recognize their marriage. A broader reading of the statute may mean that a
state, even if it is not where the same-sex couple has established their domicile,
can refuse to recognize the marriage. If the same-sex couple were involved in a
car accident where same-sex marriages are not recognized, one partner may not
be permitted to authorize any necessary medical procedures for the other. See
id. at 333.
224. See id. at 336.
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as a marriage under the laws of some other State."225 Such
rights or claims could be judgments relating to a support
award or property settlement granted in a dissolution of the
same-sex marriage or relationship.226 It is possible that if
DOMA is broadly interpreted, it would authorize other states
to refuse to enforce judgments 227 issued in the marital domi-
cile relating to spousal support, child custody,225 or property
division.229
There is also the danger that the courts will improperly
apply a broad interpretation of DOMA to adoption decrees.
While not specifically addressing adoption, DOMA allows
states to refuse recognition of "a right or claim" arising from a
same-sex relationship. 230 Generally, adoption is not a right
that emanates specifically from a same-sex marriage.231 How-
ever, it is possible that DOMA may be applicable to domestic
partnerships because, to a limited extent, they are "based on
a relationship 'treated as a marriage.'
232
If domestic partnerships are interpreted as being based
on marriage, it is possible that second-parent adoptions aris-
ing from domestic partner rights may by invalidated by
DOMA. 233  Therefore, states that currently afford domestic
partners the right of stepparent adoptions 234 may have to
225. See id. at 338; Cox, supra note 188, at 772-75. Professor Borchers states
that "I, for one, would not construe DOMA to affect the obligation of courts to
recognize money judgments simply because the existence of a same-sex mar-
riage played into the underlying theory that led to the judgment." See id. at
774-75.
226. See Strasser, supra note 117, at 337.
227. It is possible that even if DOMA is held to be constitutional, "courts will
probably be reluctant to deny enforcement of such judgments, no matter how
negative the sentiments about same-sex marriages might be in their states."
See Cox, supra note 188, at 775. If a judgment was taken to another state for
enforcement, "[tihe historical practice gives a strong presumption that such a
judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit and that the second state
could not refuse to recognize it. There is significant language in Williams I and
Williams II to support that conclusion." See Wardle, supra note 87, at 230.
228. Recognition of interstate child custody support orders are governed by
federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000).
229. See Strasser, supra note 11.7, at 337.
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
231. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (Deering 2004 and Supp. 2005).
232. See Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships:
Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235, 1246
(2001).
233. See Cox, supra note 188, at 775-76.
234. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000.
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change their laws and find another way to validate same-sex
adoptions.
Future rulings by federal courts that DOMA applies to
domestic partnerships or civil unions would probably
strengthen Oklahoma's position in Finstuen. Such rulings
may signal that the courts are straying from the historical
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and have com-
promised the Clause's principles in the face of social pres-
sures. This may allow Oklahoma to mount a stronger defense
in Finstuen.
Based on all of the above reasons, section 7502-1.4 should
be struck down as unconstitutional. The case law surround-
ing the Full Faith and Credit Clause has never created a pub-
lic policy exception to the Clause.235 Creating an exception
now could lead to broader exceptions that may hinder inter-
state travel and destroy the stability of many families.
V. PROPOSAL
The district court in Finstuen should rule that the Okla-
homa statute denying full faith and credit to valid adoption
decrees issued to same-sex couples in other states 2 6 is uncon-
stitutional. Historical constitutional principles, which have
been illustrated in recent case law, show that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause must be followed. Allowing section 7502-
1.4 to stand would run contrary to the "best interests of the
child."237 It would be a tragedy to break up already stable
families, where emotional bonds between parent and child
have already been established.
First, constitutional principles and case law show that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause continues to be a vital and
important part of our nation's identity.23 8  Without the
Clause, each state could emerge as its own sovereign entity
and refuse to acknowledge the validity of other states' judg-
ments. 239  A federal court ruling upholding the Oklahoma
statue as constitutional would be contrary to the important
principles established in cases such as Fauntleroy,24 ° Williams
235. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
236. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (West. Supp. 2004).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
238. See, e.g., Baker, 522 U.S. at 232-35.
239. See Cox, supra note 188, at 776-78.
240. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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1,241 and, more recently, Baker.242 Furthermore, if the Okla-
homa statute is upheld as constitutional by the courts, it may
signal to legislatures that courts will implicitly approve anti-
gay legislation.
The Oklahoma court system should continue to adhere to
the rich tradition of compliance with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution.243 Upholding section 7502-
1.4 would weaken the long-standing principles articulated by
the Framers in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Further-
more, it would carve out a public policy exception for state
court judgments. 2" This exception would interfere with in-
terstate travel. 24 5 If section 7502-1.4 is upheld, other states
may pass similar laws. This would result in a patchwork na-
tion where gay and lesbian families would have to avoid cer-
tain states because of the risk of losing the legal rights they
have with their children.
Section 7502-1.4 also fails to promote the "best interests
of the child.''246 It threatens to break up stable families who
have already been legally designated a family by another
state. These other states, such as California and Vermont,
have decided that it is within their public policy to encourage
the stability of such families. 247 Allowing section 7502-1.4 to
stand would upset the balance of legal rights enjoyed by these
families.
Although Oklahoma will most likely not take children
away from their families upon crossing state lines, the State
will deny children their previously-held rights. Should the
family be involved in a car accident where the biological par-
ent dies, the question of who should have custody of the chil-
dren would arise. If Oklahoma continues to adhere to its cur-
rent position on second-parent adoptions, it is possible that
241. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
242. Baker, 522 U.S. at 222.
243. Failure to adhere strictly to the Full Faith and Credit Clause may pave
the way for courts to refuse to acknowledge other types of judgments because of
public policy exceptions, though such rulings may contradict precedent. See,
e.g., id.
244. See, e.g., id. at 232.
245. It is also possible that interstate commerce would be affected. Compa-
nies would no longer know whether their judgment in one state would be en-
forced in another. Interstate commerce could be much more difficult when sis-
ter states refuse to recognize each other's valid judgments.
246. See text accompanying supra notes 37-40.
247. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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these children could be taken away from the co-parent and
custody given to the child's biological relatives.24 The serious
psychological and emotional impact of having not just one,
but two parents taken from the child in a short period of time
may have a devastating impact on the child's psychological
well-being.2 9 The Oklahoma court, in deciding this issue,
must also consider the impact of its decision on the children
of these families. The children would be discriminated
against simply because they have parents who are of the
same sex.
In the event that the district court and subsequent appel-
late courts refuse to declare the Oklahoma statute unconsti-
tutional, Congress should act by invoking its powers under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Congress has previously
exercised its power under the Clause in enacting the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act,25° which governs the recognition
and enforcement of state child custody determinations among
the states.25' There would be no reason why Congress could
not pass a similar statute governing the recognition and en-
forcement of adoption orders. In doing so, Congress would
signal to the nation the importance of family stability in
American society.
Section 7502-1.4 should be struck down as unconstitu-
tional and contrary to public policy of the United States.
Otherwise, families could be broken apart, leaving children
with only one or no legal parent. The statute is contrary to
Oklahoma's public policy on adoption, which is to promote the
"best interests of the child."2 52  If section 7502-1.4 is not
struck down by the courts, it should be repealed by the Okla-
homa legislature. If this practice of denying recognition of
same-sex adoptions issued by other states continues, Con-
gress should become involved by exercising its power under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require recognition of
valid adoption decrees across state lines.
248. See Taylor, supra note 2.
249. See Committee on Psychosocial Aspect of Child and Family Health, Co-
parent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Partners, 109 AM. ACAD. OF
PEDIATRICS 339 (Feb. 2002), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org
cgi/content/full/109/2/339.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
251. See MCDOUGAL, supra note 26, § 65, at 265.
252. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7501-1.2 (West 1998).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Section 7502-1.4 is the first of its kind in the United
States and the rulings that emanate from it will have impor-
tant doctrinal effects. The Oklahoma court's ruling will sig-
nal to the country whether the court system will adhere to the
constitutional doctrine of Full Faith and Credit. Further-
more, among the highly polarizing issues of gay rights and
gay marriage, it will signal whether the country is able to put
aside prejudices and fight for the rights of the children in-
volved. These children should not be victims of the anti-gay
sentiment that currently pervades the country. They should
be afforded the same protection and be given the same rights
as children who are in traditional heterosexual families, in-
cluding the right to two legal parents in all fifty states.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was intended to bring
together the various states as one connected whole. Even in
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has refused to ac-
knowledge a public policy exception for valid state judg-
ments.2 53 The Court has even held that no-fault divorce de-
crees should be given full faith and credit, regardless of the
forum state's policy on no-fault divorces.254 The same should
be true for adoption decrees that have been issued with both
proper subject matter and personal jurisdiction. This would
encourage stable families, families that would not be a bur-
den on the states, and families that would raise children that
will contribute to American society.
253. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
254. Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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